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Signs for the Future of  
Civil Justice Research 
Brian H. Bornstein 
The chapters in the present volume [Civil Juries and Civil Justice (New York: 
Springer, 2008)] provide a number of signs for the future of civil justice re-
search. Many of the signs are favorable and point to continued fruitful col-
laborations between legal and psychological researchers on pressing topics 
in the justice arena with important policy implications; yet the contributions 
also highlight several gaps in the literature, data limitations, and false steps. 
In other words, some of the signs are not-so-favorable, and there is still much 
work to be done. In this concluding commentary, I identify the major por-
tents for the future, both good and bad. 
Favorable Signs 
This book itself is an indication that the field is in good shape.1 The book will 
rise or fall on its own merits, but the fact that the book—and the conference 
that spawned it—attracted a stellar group of talented researchers and a lead-
ing publisher shows that there is a market for this kind of research. As noted 
in the Preface, disputes over the responsibility for injuries, and consequent 
attempts to attain justice, are an everyday occurrence. Most of these disputes 
do not ultimately result in trial by jury. As mentioned in several chapters, 
jury trials are rare, and some of the more controversial elements and types 
of trials (e.g., punitive damages, medical malpractice) are especially uncom-
mon; yet juries are nonetheless such a central feature of the American civil 
justice system, with such profound ripple effects throughout society (influ-
encing the behavior of consumers, manufacturers, insurers, policy-makers, 
and others), that their study is a worthy enterprise. A number of recent books 
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Published in B. H. Bornstein et al. (eds.), Civil Juries and Civil Justice (New York: 
Springer, 2008), pp. 273–280. Copyright © Springer 2008. Used by permission.
Correspondence—B. H. Bornstein, Department of Psychology, 328 Burnett Hall, Univer-
sity of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln NE 68588-0308, email bbornstein2@unl.edu
1 This is, of course, a rather immodest claim for an editor to make about his own book, 
which I recognize and for which I ask the reader’s indulgence. 
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on juries attest to the attention that they receive from researchers, the me-
dia, and the public (e.g., Abramson, 1994; Greene & Bornstein, 2003; Jonakait, 
2003; Sunstein, Hastie, Payne, Schkade, & Viscusi, 2002; van Koppen & Pen-
rod, 2003; Vidmar & Hans, 2007).2 
Other signs exist that civil justice research is a vibrant field. The member-
ship and conference attendance of leading interdisciplinary organizations, 
such as the American Psychology-Law Society and Law and Society Asso-
ciation, have grown steadily in recent years. Journals that frequently pub-
lish jury and related research, such as Law and Human Behavior, Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law,and Psychology, 
Crime, and Law, have seen their submission numbers and impact factors rise. 
Law journals are increasingly publishing empirical scholarship, and ‘‘empir-
ical legal studies’’ has become its own subdiscipline with its own journal, the 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, which appeared in 2004. To some extent, 
then, the field has been the beneficiary of the growth of law-and-psychology 
and law-and-social-science more broadly (see, e.g., Blumenthal, 2002; Ogloff 
& Finkelman, 1999). 
No doubt part of this growth reflects the fact that the jury system is be-
ing considered, adopted, or used more widely in a number of countries be-
sides the U.S. and U.K. (e.g., Germany, Japan, Korea, Spain, Russia; see Ka-
plan & Martin, 2006; Vidmar, 2000). Interestingly, and somewhat ironically, 
this movement toward the increasing use of juries in much of the world comes 
at a time when jury trials are on the decline in the U.S. (Galanter, 2004; Hans, 
2006). Some other countries also employ lay judges, who in terms of knowl-
edge, training, and experience are somewhere between jurors and profes-
sional judges; and empirical research has recently begun to focus on this class 
of legal decision maker (e.g., Bliesener, 2006; Diamond, 2003). Like lay judges, 
professional judges behave similarly to jurors in many respects (Robbennolt, 
2005), but there are differences between these two types of legal decision mak-
ers as well (Diamond, 2003; Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2001). As jurors 
are not the only factfinders who resolve disputes at trial, it is encouraging that 
more research is focusing on these other decision makers as well. 
The study of other kinds of legal decision makers has required the devel-
opment and adoption of new research methods. For example, it is harder 
(though not impossible) to get judges to act as ‘‘mock judges’’ and read or 
view a simulated trial than it is to get college undergraduates to serve as 
mock jurors. Thus, the bulk of legal decision making research involves stu-
dent mock jurors who read a simulated trial (Bornstein, 1999). The limita-
tions, as well as the advantages, of jury simulations as a research tool have 
2 It is not a coincidence that some of these books have authors who are also contributors to 
the present volume. The list is selective and, in addition to omitting other scholarly works, 
leaves out the large number of novels about juries and books written, in some cases by ju-
rors themselves, about individual well-publicized jury trials. The volume of these works 
also attests to the public’s seemingly insatiable appetite for information on juries. 
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been amply demonstrated (Bornstein, 1999; Bornstein & McCabe, 2005; Dia-
mond, 1997; Kerr & Bray, 2005; Vidmar, this volume). 
The use of diverse methodologies, such as juror interviews and case stud-
ies, is increasing, as illustrated by some of the selections in this book (see 
chapters by Vidmar and Hans). The increase in the number of archival analy-
ses of actual jury verdicts, as exemplified by the empirical legal studies move-
ment, also contributes to this diversity (see chapters by Sharkey, Eisenberg 
et al., and Poser). Field studies are another valuable piece of the puzzle, as 
they afford a degree of experimental control within a real-world context; but 
they are difficult and expensive to conduct and therefore rare. Using mul-
tiple methodologies to investigate the same issue is valuable because of the 
principle of convergent validity (Wiener, this volume); simply put, one can 
be more confident in the ‘‘truth’’ of some finding if it has been demonstrated 
across multiple contexts or exemplars using a variety of techniques.3 The in-
creasing use of diverse research methods is clearly a good sign for the field, 
but as Vidmar (this volume) points out, researchers should use more ecologi-
cally valid methods more of the time. 
Not-So-Favorable Signs 
Part of the allure of studying jurors is that in addition to performing research 
that has policy implications, the jury is an ideal laboratory within which to 
study basic psychological processes such as decision making, hypothesis 
testing, persuasion, and group dynamics (Kerr & Bray, 2005). Thus, jury re-
searchers have, in a very real sense, the best of both worlds: the opportu-
nity to make scientific as well as practical contributions. Many, if not most, 
researchers would agree that the best possible sign for civil justice research 
would be that the research is having some sort of real-world impact. Indeed, 
the best sort of psycholegal research adheres to a model of ‘‘social analytic ju-
risprudence,’’ which combines legal and psychological analysis of legal doc-
trines with empirical research methods to bear on law and policy (Wiener, 
2007). Empirical research on juries is critical to the proper establishment of 
policies governing jury trials, such as requirements regarding a jury’s size, 
composition, decision rule, and other procedures (Saks, 1989, 1992). As Born-
stein and Robicheaux describe in their introductory chapter, the tort reform 
debate has become increasingly data-driven, which is a good thing; nonethe-
less, legislators still evince a disturbing tendency to enact reforms in the ab-
sence of data demonstrating their effectiveness. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
3 There are never any guarantees, and there are no conventions for how to weigh conflicting 
findings. Findings can be contradictory not only across research methods but within a 
particular method depending on a variety of factors, such as assumptions, choice of data 
set, and analytic techniques (see Eisenberg et al., this volume). 
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some of these non-empirically-based reforms have turned out to be counter-
productive. Unintended effects can occur, at least under some circumstances, 
for such reform measures as caps (Robbennolt & Studebaker, 1999; Sharkey, 
2005; Sharkey, this volume) and split-recovery statutes (Sharkey, 2003). 
There is also little evidence that empirical social scientific research is influ-
encing the courts. For example, civil jury researchers submitted amicus cur-
iae briefs in the two most recent punitive damages cases decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court (Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 2007; State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, 2003), but neither opinion cited 
the brief, and in both cases the respondent (in support of whom the brief was 
submitted) lost.4 
It is interesting to consider why jury research has had relatively little impact 
on the courts, whereas other experimental psychological research, such as the 
study of eyewitness memory, has made significant inroads (Benton, McDon-
nell, Ross, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 2007; Technical Working Group for Eyewit-
ness Evidence, 1999).5 In part, it seems to reflect an expectation that jurors can 
make the sorts of decisions required in civil cases (e.g., negligence, damages) 
just fine despite receiving little guidance (Greene & Bornstein, 2000). Attorneys 
themselves are aware that it is not all common sense—hence the rise of trial 
consulting in civil cases (Bornstein & Greene, in press; Hastie, this volume). 
Rather than hiring consultants or retaining experts, wouldn’t it be better, 
and more efficient, to train the attorneys themselves? Even though expert tes-
timony, often of a scientific and/or experimental nature, is quite common in 
trials nowadays (Vidmar, this volume), few law schools offer instruction in 
scientific research methods or statistics. A survey of new law school course 
offerings (1994–1997) conducted by the Association of American Law Schools 
that reported the top 25 areas of curricular growth had no entries for statis-
tics, research methods, or scientific practice (Merritt & Cihon, 1997). How-
ever, an entry for ‘‘nonlegal skills’’ under ‘‘additional areas of potential 
curricular growth’’ did include 10 courses (from 83 law schools) on ‘‘quan-
titative methods, statistics, or social science techniques’’ (Merritt & Cihon, p. 
561). Thus, although most law students still finish law school without any 
significant empirical training, there are signs of progress.6 This is not to say, 
of course, that having lawyers with a modicum of scientific or methodologi-
4 The present author signed the Philip Morris brief, and several other contributors to the 
present volume also signed one or both briefs. 
5 Although it has had little impact on caselaw, jury research has contributed to some proce-
dural changes. For example, findings demonstrating poor comprehension of judge’s in-
structions by jurors have contributed to the revision of instructions by some states, such 
as California (Miller & Bornstein, 2004; Post, 2004). 
6 It is possible, of course, that more courses have been added in the 10 years since this survey 
was conducted, a possibility corroborated by an informal survey done recently by Robert 
Lawless, Jennifer Robbennolt, and Thomas Ulen (Robbennolt, personal communication), 
who are preparing a textbook on the topic (Lawless, Robbennolt, & Ulen, in press). 
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cal training would obviate the need for consultants or experts in all cases; but 
it would undoubtedly reduce attorneys’ reliance on them, and it would en-
able them to make better use of their services when they were retained. 
One of the biggest shortcomings in civil justice research, as a field, is its 
overemphasis on jury behavior to the near exclusion of alternative methods 
of dispute resolution. Several chapters, particularly those in Section IV, high-
light this shortcoming. As Tomkins and Applequist (this volume) note, there 
are many aspects of justice: distributive, procedural, restorative, and retribu-
tive, to which one could also add interactional (Robbennolt, this volume) and 
corrective (Sheinman, 2003; see generally, Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 
1997). These various aspects of justice are all implicated in dispute resolution 
at trial, but their principles can also be employed to understand civil dispute 
resolution outside the courtroom litigation context, where it occurs much more 
often. There are lots of civil disputes, and most of them are resolved with-
out a trial, by some alternative means. Not only can other approaches to jus-
tice, such as therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice, be incorporated 
into tort litigation—as by encouraging harmdoers to apologize and protecting 
their statements from expanded liability—but they have the power in many 
cases to preempt litigation altogether by facilitating settlement or discourag-
ing the filing of a claim in the first place (see chapters by Robbennolt, Greene, 
& Landsman). This would make trials both less likely to occur and less painful 
when they do occur (see chapter by Greene, this volume). Researchers would 
do well to heed Tomkins and Applequist’s recommendation to devote more 
time and resources to studying justice issues in non-trial contexts. 
The emphasis on juries also obscures the fact there are many other, po-
tentially more beneficial and cost-effective, ways to improve the civil justice 
system. Improving jury instructions, mentioned above, is one example; the 
chapter by Bornstein and Robicheaux (this volume) mentions other possibili-
ties, many of them endorsed by organizations such as the American Tort Re-
form Association, but which receive much less attention. For instance, pro-
moting jury service and sound science in the courtroom are uncontroversial 
goals that could yield enormous benefits. Both would lead to a more efficient 
system, and the latter would undoubtedly lead to more just outcomes. 
There are many procedures outside the litigation context that would fur-
ther the aims of justice as well. In light of the small number of trials (espe-
cially jury trials), it is necessary to focus reform efforts where they can do the 
most good. In the healthcare context, that means worrying less about mal-
practice lawsuits and more about reducing medical errors and changing med-
ical attitudes and culture (see chapters by Landsman and Miller). There are 
many medical errors (Institute of Medicine, 2000), but few lawsuits; so strat-
egies should focus on preventing the injuries in the first place. Nor should 
physicians be singled out for their ‘‘juryphobia’’: It is rampant in society, af-
flicting product manufacturers, businesses, service providers, and govern-
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ments. Everyone has his or her favorite example of how juryphobia has got-
ten out of control and diminished our quality of life. One that hits close to 
home for me is that many golf courses no longer place water coolers along 
the course, due to fears that the water might somehow become contaminated 
and make an unsuspecting golfer sick. And excessive warnings are every-
where (e.g., ‘‘Do not place hands under lawnmower while blade is moving’’). 
As in the case of medical malpractice, the specter of a jury trial, legal liability, 
and a large damage award loom large in these cases— but the problem goes 
well beyond the jury. 
The excessive emphasis on physicians’ liability in malpractice trials also 
ignores the much more common, and potentially more vexing, issue of med-
ical injuries and evidence, as well as testimony by physician witnesses who 
are not party to the lawsuit. After all, trials involving physical or psychologi-
cal (as opposed to financial or property) injury are going to contain testimony 
describing the nature and extent of the injury. Often, though not always, 
medical experts will provide testimony in these cases, in order to character-
ize or quantify the harm that has been done (Bornstein & Greene, in press). 
There are many variables to consider in addressing the effect that such testi-
mony is likely to have, especially when the injury’s effects are not readily ob-
servable (Hans, this volume). Physicians have a much larger role to play in 
the civil justice system than merely as possible defendants. 
Conclusion 
Empirical research on civil juries is a relatively young field, dating back 
roughly to the 1950s (Kalven, 1958, 1964). The empirical study of civil jus-
tice is somewhat older, and philosophical discussions of justice go back thou-
sands of years; but there is still much research to be done on these topics. In 
the present chapter, I have tried to identify some of the promising signs for 
the field as a whole, while also pointing out limitations and areas where there 
is room for improvement. 
Questions of civil justice raise much larger issues than whether juries do 
a good or poor job and how we can improve their performance. They go to 
normative questions about what is fair and reasonable and the kind of so-
ciety we wish to live in. Nonetheless, civil juries and civil justice are inter-
twined. Whether we like it or not, jurors are the poster children of our civil 
justice system. As psycholegal researchers, we should study more than just 
juries; but a better understanding of juries would go a long way toward the 
larger goal of achieving civil justice. 
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